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The article concludes that although the Norwegian IT industry has been lacking in export success 
the last 30 years, it has been important for the development of the Norwegian economy. Several 
IT companies have been on the verge of international breakthroughs, but have been stopped by 
rising costs and guided by national opportunities. The rise of the important oil-sector has been 
both a hindrance and an opportunity for the Norwegian IT industry. Specialised products for 
national markets rather than general mass-market products have become the norm for the 
Norwegian IT industry. This development had to a remarkable degree been associated with 
continuity in terms of organisations and people. The firms these people and organisations have 
been attached too, however, have experienced turbulence, bankruptcy and change, making the 
whole development from 1970 until today a seemingly messy and problematic affair. But this 
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Introduction 
Although Norway is one of the world’s richest nations and consequently a large user of IT 
equipment and IT solutions, it remains a relatively small producer of IT equipment.
1 Of the four, 
rich Nordic nations, Norway has the smallest production of IT goods, both in terms of absolute 
value and in terms of the IT production as percentage of total industrial output.
2 Norwegian 
imports of IT goods have at the start of this century for some years constituted about three times 
the value of Norwegian IT exports. In terms of quantitative significance of what may be termed 
“national IT competence”, Norway is the Nordic jumbo. This chapter sets out to shed light on 
how the Norwegian IT industry has developed and why Norway has become such a 
comparatively poor IT performer. 
  
It is not because of a late start. Norway was an early starter in what became the IT industry.
3 
Already in 1882 a Norwegian maker of telecommunications equipment was started, Elektrisk 
Bureau, based on the very early and intense use of telephone in Norway. Elektrisk Bureau also 
soon had exports and foreign operations at the turn of the last century.
4 Prior to World War II 
several new electronic companies were started, mostly making different kinds of radios, and 
gradually a fully-fledged industry formed and developed, to a substantial degree in relationship 
with Government policies promoting IT production. Both Tandbergs Radiofabrikk and Norsk 
Data were at times quite successful in foreign markets, and especially Tandberg was well known. 
But the success disappeared as time went on, and for the time being Norway is the worst Nordic 
performer. 
    2
The staggering difference in 2007 between Norway and its Nordic neighbours Sweden and 
Finland is the absence of any large multinational company in the IT sector. Sweden’s Ericsson 
and Finland’s Nokia are not matched by any comparable Norwegian enterprise, and even fellow 
Nordic IT laggard Denmark has world-famous consumer electronics company Bang & Olufsen 
to its name. Why is Norway not more successful? Could it be because of lack of competence? 
Probably not, but more will be said about that later. There is an argument for the cost-increasing 
and crowding out effect of the large oil and gas sector in the Norwegian economy since the mid 
1970s that has made it difficult for Norwegian export-conscious IT companies to grow profitably 
abroad, and this important argument will be extensively discussed below.
5 But let it already be 
said here that since Norway is not the only Nordic exception to industrial success, there might be 
something to be learned from oil-free Denmark – a rich, small nation with a large IT sector and a 
comparatively small own production. Clearly Denmark and Norway have used IT in various 
ways and profited from this, the results of which may be found in general economic growth 
figures and not so much in IT industry statistics. 
 
The focus in this discussion will be on the IT industry, i.e. the industrial and research-based part 
of the IT sector, arguably the best way to gain insight into the Norwegian national IT 
competence and its competitiveness. The following chapter is divided into five parts. First, the 
current situation is discussed, leading to a discussion of the historic development of the 
Norwegian IT industry, with emphasis on understanding the situation at the beginning of the 
1970s. Then the development during the troubled 1970s and 1980s is discussed in two parts, 
before the ensuing changes of the IT industry are analysed. Finally, at the end, there will be a 
discussion of the long-term implications of this.    3
Large user, small producer (1970-2005) 
The four Nordic countries are very similar in terms of population, economic structure and 
history. Sweden, with around nine million inhabitants, is roughly twice as large as each of the 
other three nations, and Finland – with its later start as an independent nation and its different 
language – is the odd nation out. But by and large the four are quite equal, and among these one 
has to be the worst IT performer in terms of industrial performance. That place belongs to 
Norway. 
 
The gross turnover in the ICT sector of these four nations is remarkably similar, as is underlined 
by Table 1 below where absolute turnover is corrected by population size. While Norway has the 
smallest turnover in absolute terms, Norway is also the least populated nation of the four, and the 
small differences between Norway and Denmark and Finland may be explained by those 
differences. Sweden, with a global player in telecommunications along with a thriving Internet 
business up until 2000, was the biggest of the four. Finland was industrialized later than the other 
three nations, and the table more than underlines that Finland has caught up and is well able to 
compete. 
 
[TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
 
Sweden and Finland have more people employed in the IT sector than Norway and Denmark. 
Although the number of people employed in Norway is a significant one with around 80 000 
employed in 2001-3, this is by far the smallest number of the four nations. Finland and Sweden, 
with their huge Nokia- and Ericsson- successes respectively, have the largest number of   4
employees in terms of population, also when correcting for population size. Sweden may have 
been hit the hardest by the dot.com-crises, i.e. the special crisis in the Internet business that was 
integral to the general stock-market crisis in 2000. Sweden’s entrepreneurial effort in the Internet 
business was huge in the late 1990s, and the fall was consequently high. The national flagship, 
Ericsson, also restructured in the period after 2000 and a number of employees lost their jobs. 
 
By and large Table 1 underlines the importance of ICT in the four Nordic countries. World 
Economic Forum, the business meeting held in Davos, Switzerland, along with the Swiss 
business school Insead, do a yearly ranking of global ICT capabilities, “The Networked 
Readiness Index”, and here the four Nordic countries do extremely well.
6 Denmark was on top of 
the 2007 rankings, with Sweden (second), Finland (fourth) and Norway (tenth) among the ten top 
achievers. The high general use of ICT also corresponds with a large ICT service-sector in all 
four countries, along with efforts in production of goods and programming tools. 
 
It would be of great interest to see what the impact of ICT services on the Norwegian economy 
has been. Use of ICT – broadly defined – started early and had great impact in a number of 
businesses, not least insurance and banking.
7 The Bull name in Honeywell-Bull came from the 
Norwegian Fredrik Rosing Bull who started out making tabulator-machines for the Norwegian 
insurance company Storebrand in the late 1910s and before he went to France. More recently 
retailing and other services have made a great use of ICT, possibly with great effects, though the 
real economic impact of ICT is debated.
8 That whole – huge – sector of service providers, 
software houses, and ICT departments in large companies of various sorts, is beyond the scope   5
of this article. The statistics do not easily tell the story of what is happening around the service 
providers, but there is no denying the huge activity – 45,7 billion Norwegian kroner in 2004.
9 
 
Norway has gained a software sector of some importance, though it is difficult to define the 
extent of this sector. Most of the people doing research in Kongsberg Gruppen, the largest 
Norwegian ICT enterprise, are in some way doing programming.
10 Most of the people in “the 
software sector” – elsewhere – are doing some kind of service that is very remotely connected to 
the making of standardized IT goods, which is what Kongsberg Gruppen makes. There are very 
few Norwegian makers of standardized software that are competitive internationally, but the 
most renowned are the Internet-browser Opera, the data-search maker Fast and the developer of 
programming language Trolltech. Trolltech develops programming language in an incidental 
continuation of the 1960s Norwegian international success, Simula. Simula was a language 
introducing so-called modularity and has been used extensively for regulatory purposes.
11 The 
two men behind the language were professors at the University of Oslo, and one of them had his 
background at the National Defence Research Establishment. Simula never became a 
commercial success, but was a technical breakthrough for a way of programming. It underlines 
ambitions and competence in the Norwegian IT sector, present for several decades. It also makes 
the question of why Norway has not achieved more export success very relevant.  
 
The remarkable differences between the Nordic countries come through when their indigenous 
ICT production is compared. Table 2 – made up by “Audio and Video equipment”, “Computers 
etc.”, “Components”, “Telecommunications” and “Other”, and with consultancy and software 
left out – gives the broad picture of national production. In terms of numerical values the Nordic   6
countries contains two clear leaders, Finland and Sweden, and two laggards, Denmark and 
Norway.  Further reading of the underlying statistics uncovers the result of two 
telecommunication companies’ huge global success, namely that of Finland’s Nokia and 
Sweden’s Ericsson. Stripped by the success of their huge production of telecommunications, the 
numbers of Finland and Sweden are not that impressive compared to Norway and Denmark. Yet 
these companies’ huge success must to some degree reflect their national roots and the task to be 
explained on Norway’s part may therefore to a large degree be why there are no large Norwegian 
IT companies. 
 
[TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE] 
 
 
Denmark comes across through these numbers as not up to Sweden and Finland’s standard, but 
that should be seen against the background of Denmark’s commercial success being larger than 
these numbers imply. While the numerical value of Norwegian exports of ICT goods is almost 
equal to that of ICT production, the Danish exports are almost twice the size of its production.
12 
That difference may be accounted for by re-exports and export-sales of software and services. 
 
Table 2 also shows how the rise of Finland is such a remarkable phenomenon. The 1973 
numbers for the “electronics industry”, which in most respects is the same as the IT industry, 
show Finland to have been the clear Nordic jumbo in 1973. It only goes to show how remarkable 
the rise of Nokia has been. Yet Sweden, too, being the most successful in 1973, is a great growth 
success in the ensuing years, and that must also to a large degree be because of its large 
manufacturer of telecommunications. Indeed, the numbers for 1973 comes from a 1976 official   7
Norwegian investigation into the future of the electronics industry, and here the importance of 
Ericsson for Sweden was remarked upon already then.
13  
 
Much of the 1970s policy discussion on the future of the Norwegian IT industry revolved around 
how to create successful exporters. This was hardly an unqualified success. Yet the numbers in 
Table 2 also reveal that the period from 1973 until the present has been one of growth, and that 
the performance of Denmark is not that different from Norway’s. Since this is also the period of 
industrial transformation from “electronics” to IT – in large part from analog to digital 
technology – the overall growth for such rich and research orientated countries could have been 
expected to be higher. Finland and Sweden were global innovators in telecommunications in the 
period, while Norway and Denmark remained fairly small makers of IT. 
 
The closer look at the Norwegian experience over the period from the early 1970s reveal – as 
seen in figure 1 – a rather steady development over long periods of time, with rather sudden and 
short-term variations. That development will be expanded upon below, but here a few words 
should be said about these numbers. The figure is based on two slightly different classification 
systems. The numbers from 1972 to 1992 are based on the ISIC-classification, while the numbers 
from 1992 to 2005 are made according to the NACE-definitions.
14 Quite possibly the earlier 
numbers overestimate the size of the IT industry in the period 1972-1992, as is indicated when 
numbers from the same years are compared (see 1992 in the figure).  The number for employees 
is 12 % higher in 1989 according to ISIC-numbers than according to NACE-numbers, and the 
number of employees given for the year 1973 in the above-mentioned investigation of 1976 is 17 
% lower than in figure 1. But by and large the numbers from the two classifications fit relatively   8
well, and they tell a story of an industry that from the years since 1972 have doubled in size of 
production, employs almost the same number of people, and whose sustainable growth – if such 
a term can be used – has come since the early and mid-1990s. 
 
[FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
 
The Norwegian growth came, however, without large and visible companies. The difference 
between Norway and Finland and Sweden may be sought in the question of why Norway has not 
fostered a large IT company, and in the following the Norwegian development will be analysed 
from a company perspective. Why did the Norwegian pretenders of the 1970s and 1980s not 
succeed? Is there to be found a common reason behind these failures? After all, the development 
of Norway – slow growth and revolutionary change – is not so bad. Yet at the start of this period 
– let us say in 1973 – the situation may even have looked quite promising, and certainly Norway 
was ahead of Finland. 
 
An industry set to grow? (1900-1973) 
The best explanation for Norway not to have a success like Nokia or Ericsson may be the 
presence of Nokia and Ericsson. There simply was not room for a Norwegian version of this 
Nordic path to international success. But the question of why there was no Norwegian Nokia is a 
better one than the superficiality such a question normally entails. If there was one area where 
Norway had broad and deep competence, it concerned mobile telecommunications. 
   9
Norway was an early starter. The aforementioned Elektrisk Bureau was fairly successful until the 
crisis in the 1920s when Swedish L.M. Ericsson bought a controlling share in the crisis-ridden 
Norwegian competitor. In the early 1930s, in the reorganisation in the aftermath of Swedish 
entrepreneur Ivar Kreuger’s death, another foreign-owned Norwegian telecommunications 
company, STK (Standard Telefon og Kabel) was created by ITT on the basis of an import 
company and a Norwegian cable-maker.
15 L.M. Ericsson-controlled Elektrisk Bureau and ITT-
controlled STK became from the early 1930s and up to 1990 the providers of 
telecommunications to the Norwegian telecom operator, Televerket. Both of them had 
Norwegian minority shareholders, both of them had large production in Norway, both of them 
had some Norwegian research activity, and they were – in the early 1970s – two of the five 
largest Norwegian electronics companies in terms of turnover and employment with well over 
1000 employees each. They were also controlled by an oligopolistic grip by the international 
operators L.M. Ericsson and ITT. So Norway had a telecommunications industry, albeit one 
controlled from abroad. 
 
Norway’s strongest national asset may have been its broad competence in radio communications. 
While Norway may have been a typical industrial country with strong interest in radio receivers 
that became the foundation of the modern consumer electronics industry, Norway had large 
merchant- and fishing-fleets purchasing communication equipment since the 1910s. In the 
interwar years this demand was met by an array of research-intensive small operations – 
Elektrisk Bureau, STK, the Norwegian Marconi-company, the Norwegian Telefunken-company 
and some wholly Norwegian companies – making radio equipment.
16 While World War II and 
ensuing developments to some extent changed the fortunes of this industrial segment, it was   10
important until the 1970s when the process of introducing satellite-communication began. 
Norway have had a strong national and Government-funded commitment to space research for 
meteorological and telecommunication purposes,
17 and the company Nera – a wholly Norwegian 
continuation of Norwegian Telefunken – became the main Norwegian operator in satellite-
telephony, being the heir to the old maritime radio industry. 
 
Equally important was the change in Nera’s fortunes just after World War II and its inclusion 
into national policy. Through allied wartime research, Norwegian engineers had been involved in 
large radar projects.
18 When this competence was continued within the 1946 creation NDRE 
(National Defence Research Establishment), collaboration with Nera was soon established. The 
knowledge from military radar projects was transformed to military and civilian radio-link 
technology, radio-links being wireless radio-transmission of telecommunications and an 
alternative to cable not least in a mountain-rich country like Norway.
19 Nera became a medium 
sized Norwegian company with several hundred employees, depending on Norwegian and 
NATO markets for civilian and military products, as well as the odd project for developing 
nations. 
 
Nera – along with Simrad – was perhaps the one company up until the 1970s that was shaped the 
most by Government R & D funding. A host of new organizations were started after the war, 
creating a new public research infrastructure of Norway. The new organizations included the 
aforementioned NDRE and Simrad, as well as two national research councils and two important 
research establishments for the technical research council and the Norwegian Technical 
University respectively. While Nera was linked to the effects of allied research in radar, Simrad   11
was influenced by allied research in telecommunications and hydro-acoustics. The founder of 
Simrad, Willy Simonsen, coming from a business family and being a leader in British walkie 
talkie construction during the war, established a company selling radiotelephones to the large 
Norwegian fishing-fleet. He was himself involved in technical issues for the company in the 
beginning, not least when Simrad shaped naval echosounders and sonar-equipment licenced from 
NDRE into small and efficient fish-finding equipment sold increasingly globally. 
 
Simrad’s founder Willy Simonsen was a transitory figure in Norway, bridging the gap between 
the prewar entrepreneurial community of founders of electronics companies based on 
competence gleaned from an education abroad (in Simonsen’s case, Dresden) or in Norway, and 
the postwar industrial effort that to a much larger degree involved public research institutions. 
The prewar entrepreneurial effort created a Norwegian radio industry selling receivers for the 
national broadcasts. Up until the early 1950s, and the postwar crisis of the Norwegian radio 
industry, there were tens of makers. Some of these were established by amateurs with little 
education, and others, like Vebjørn Tandberg, were well-educated engineers with contacts in the 
few prewar research institutions, but were, when all was said and done, independent 
industrialists. Vebjørn Tandberg with his Tandbergs Radiofabrikk and his brand “Tandberg” was 
hugely successful, and in 1972, through the merger with long-time competitor Radionette, 
Tandberg was in all respects the last of these radio makers.
20 In 1972 Tandberg was among the 
three largest electronics makers in Norway, with a healthy export of tape recorders and stereo 
equipment and a growth-policy in colour televisions and a research program in computers. 
Tandberg was a small “Philips” – the Dutch giant – and a source of national pride.   12
The last of the main Norwegian companies of the period that must be mentioned is Kongsberg 
Våpenfabrikk, the state owned weapons-manufacturer that since the late 1950s had been 
upgraded to become a maker of advanced rockets and command and control systems as well as 
other products for various automation purposes.
21 Kongsberg Våpenfabrikk worked in tandem 
with some of the above-mentioned public research institutions, but the main provider of new 
products was the NDRE, an increasingly independent promoter of new technology on the 
Norwegian research policy scene.
22 Kongsberg Våpenfabrikk was involved in a host of new 
technological activities reaching beyond IT, but there was a strong digital technological approach 
leading to signal-processing and systems technologies.
23 Kongsberg Våpenfabrikk also made 
mini computers beginning around 1970, and the computer technology was also received from the 
NDRE. 
 
NDRE and the other research-institutions had an increasingly important role for the Norwegian 
IT industry. NDRE is particularly known for its role in the modernisation of Kongsberg 
Våpenfabrikk, its relationship with Simrad and the fact that several of its engineers in the late 
1960s broke out and established the mini computer maker Norsk Data. Norsk Data was a very 
early starter in this industry, and had by the early 1970s established itself technologically and 
internationally, even though it was at the time a very small company. Just how important and 
what the general influence of the government’s research institutions were in all places and at all 
times has not really been investigated by historians. Elektrisk Bureau, STK and Tandberg were 
quite large and until the mid-1960s, their research was quite independent of the public effort and 
funded from company sources. The two telecommunications companies also had international 
partners. In hindsight, the influence of the public research institutions is easily overstated by   13
comparison with the R&D efforts of the larger industrial enterprises, at least up to the end of the 
1960s. In addition to Norsk Data, the most important new company was AME (A/S Mikro-
Elektronikk and originally called Akers Electronics), a maker of integrated circuits established in 
1965 as a spin-off of the technical research council’s research establishment.
24  
 
The influence of the Norwegian research-institutions gained in importance, and when the 
national telecommunications provider, Televerket (Telenor since 1994) started its own research 
institute in 1967, both Elektrisk Bureau and STK felt compelled to start their own formal 
research laboratories to collaborate with Televerket.
25 Televerket’s R&D Institute wanted, 
among other things, to help Nera to become a satellite communications company, and to help 
Elektrisk Bureau and STK to become more independent of their mother companies and possibly 
gaining a role of lead houses within their respective multinational corporation.
26 
 
Overall, the development of the Norwegian IT industry until 1973 may be described as an 
amalgamation between private enterprise and public research policy, with public research policy 
playing an increasingly important role.
27 Up until around 1960 and the impact of the debate on 
economic growth, the Norwegian IT policy rested on research policy. The industrial policy of 
Norway – which since 1945 had been quite interventionist – did not really concern the 
electronics industry. However, due to a number of developments, not least the discovery of the 
“residual” and the impact of technology on economic growth, electronics suddenly had center 
stage of industrial policy.
28 The modernisation of state owned Kongsberg Våpenfabrikk, and the 
start of AME, as well as Governmental finance for development projects done by Norsk Data, 
Simrad and other companies were part of this policy change.    14
The Ministry of Industry had little directly to do with these changes, as the new industrial 
policies of the 1960s were delegated to three or four government-appointed organizations for 
financing various worthy causes. The overall strategy constituted a kind of “indicative planning” 
with the government funding indicated priorities like development activities, export 
collaboration, mergers and locational issues. With the coming of the 1970s the Ministry of 
Industry became increasingly involved as the need for continued growth was deemed important, 
and the possibilities for such growth were seen – by several political parties, but especially the 
Labour party – to be found in increased collaboration between companies, the Government and 
various public organizations. In 1973 the Government proposed a national investigation of the 




Revolutionary change, part I 
In retrospect, there is every reason to applaud much of what went into what might be called ”a 
national plan” for electronics in the 1970s: Norway had a concerted effort in new digital 
technology, through new companies, research organizations and the modernization process of 
older companies like Kongsberg Våpenfabrikk. Several companies, in addition to Tandbergs 
Radiofabrikk and Simrad, Kongsberg Våpenfabrikk must be mentioned along with Nera, had 
some export success. Yet when all is summed up from 1990 as a vantage point, almost 
everything was in ruins. None of the main Norwegian companies existed in the same form as 
they had entered the 1970s, and in no instance could that development be counted as something 
remotely positive.   15
What happened was the combined result of several factors, but the difference between Norway 
and all other industrial nations was the complex and dramatic effects of the domestic oil and gas 
industry on the Norwegian economy. One crucial consequence of the oil and gas was to increase 
the cost structure of the whole economy, the IT exporters included. But this is only a partial 
reason for the IT industry’s development, and other factors also made their mark. The 1970s 
differed from the 1980s. The companies most severely affected by the 1970s were Tandbergs 
Radiofabrikk, Simrad and Nera as well as a host of smaller companies, while Elektrisk Bureau, 
STK, Norsk Data and Kongsberg Våpenfabrikk were severely hit by the developments of the 
1980s. 
 
The actual effect of the oil in the Norwegian economy of the 1970s was indirect.
30 Policymakers’ 
expectations of large oil revenues were instrumental in the strong counter-cyclical Keynesian 
economic policy applied during the downturn following the OPEC oil price increases of 1973. 
The situation for a new oil producer like Norway was contradictory of course, for the very price 
shocks that negatively affected the world economy had a positive effect on the new oil sector of 
the Norwegian economy. The pressure in the Norwegian economy in the years 1975-78 came 
from a collection of state budget deficits, helping packages for export industry in trouble, as well 
as the rapid rise of a new sector being built to extract and process the oil that was increasingly 
coming into production. The effects of this new environment on IT companies like Tandberg 
were complex: On the one hand they could find Governmental support for nearly every 
constructive effort to restructure, but on the other hand those “gifts” were part of a broader 
economic transformation that drove costs up to an increasingly painful level. Tandberg started to 
lose money and ended as a fully state owned company in 1978 when the problems progressed to   16
a level it could not deal with. Yet almost at the same time that the state fully took over, the 
Minister of Industry realized Tandberg could not be saved and the company went bankrupt in 
December 1978. 
 
Tandberg’s problems were, of course, not solely related to its Norwegian location. Competitive 
and technological changes deeply affected the company’s situation. In the aftermath of the 
bankruptcy there was not difficult to name a number of factors that undermined Tandberg’s 
situation. But these factors also affected most of the European consumer electronics industry at 
the time and some companies survived, like the Danish firm Bang & Olufsen. The avenue 
followed by Bang & Olufsen in its successful restructuring, which emphasized exterior design, 
increased reliance on purchased technology and large reorganization and sackings – was not 
taken by Tandberg, for a complex number of reasons.
31 First, Tandberg was very conscious 
about design, and while Bang & Olufsen chose a minimalist modern design there is a certain 
techno-Scandinavian flair (metal and polished wood) connected to Tandberg’s products that had 
large appeal. There is no evidence that Tandberg’s products had any design disadvantages, and 
Tandberg’s sales slightly exceeded those of Bang & Olufsen until the early 1970s. Prior to Bang 
& Olufsen’s large reorganization in 1974/75, Tandberg had much higher turnover per employee 
than Bang & Olufsen, evidence of better organization of production and a hint that Tandberg’s 
last “pre crisis” CEO, Andreas Skogvold, was onto something when he – after the bankruptcy – 
claimed that Tandberg in early 1977 was better at the technical aspects of automation of colour 
television production than the Japanese.
32 Skogvold was an expert on automation and had visited 
several Japanese plants. But Skogvold also argued that the Japanese worked harder and were 
more disciplined than the Tandberg employees.   17
And here was the problem: Tandberg was a model enterprise, famous for its remarkable 
industrial relations, which had been conscientiously nurtured since the 1940s by founder and 
CEO until 1974, Vebjørn Tandberg. Sackings and downsizing were out of the question, and ever 
since the company had introduced new products like the tape recorder in the early 1950s, new 
products were seen as both replacements for products with saturated markets and tools for 
growth. In the 1970s Tandberg was to grow with colour televisions (Tandberg was the second 
foreign firm to produce colour televisions in Great Britain in the 1970s, after Sony).
33 In the 
1980s, when Tandberg perceived the colour television market to be saturated, Tandberg was to 
grow with new computer products, streamers (based on Tandberg’s tape recorder technology) 
and monitors (from television). So the outstretched Governmental hand, attached to a growth-
oriented policy that built on the above-mentioned national investigation of electronics, supported 
Tandberg’s efforts to develop new products to support growth. The Ministry of Industry even 
made a plan in 1976 to concentrate the national R&D efforts around three cornerstone enterprises 
that were to operate in the middle of the electronics industry: Tandberg in consumer electronics, 
state owned Kongsberg Våpenfabrikk in defence electronics and a partly nationalized Elektrisk 
Bureau in telecommunications.
34 When the decisions about Tandberg’s future were made in 
early 1976, and the company was in such trouble that it had to harshly restructure and sack 
employees to continue as an independent company, the Government’s willingness to help won 
the day. CEO Andreas Skogvold’s plan to cut costs and reorganize was overruled by the board of 
directors, a decision supported by Vebjørn Tandberg (member of the board), the Government 
and the labour unions, all of whom agreed that Tandberg should slug it out and hope for better 
days, financed by the Government. From then on everything went to pieces.   18
Could Tandberg have survived? Bang & Olufsen did. Some of Tandberg’s business continues 
until this day and is mainly represented by the computer products organized in two stock-listed 
companies. The high end stereo business have several, small companies as survivors, but the 
products aimed at large quality mass markets where Tandberg was famous in Norway and abroad 
was discontinued, as was the colour television production. Survival for Tandberg would have 
required many changes and adaptations, not least the ability to deal with abrupt sackings and 
what would have entailed a radical shift in the organizational culture. But in terms of market 
position, R & D-capabilities and the technical knowledge about automated production, Tandberg 
had a decent platform with which to try. But the political support and financing for continued 
reliance on past strategies in a new globally competitive market meant that the firm never 
pursued such a radical (and risky) strategy and Norway’s single most important electronics 
company went bankrupt. 
 
Two of Tandberg’s problems – the economic pressure in the Norwegian economy and the 
technological shift – affected most of Norway’s IT companies. Perhaps Kongsberg 
Våpenfabrikk, which had had a digital IT strategy since 1960, was the least affected as it did not 
have any old electronics products in its portfolio, and the 1976 cornerstone plan made much 
more sense for this defence-centred company than it did for Tandberg. Kongsberg Våpenfabrikk 
purchased a couple of troubled Norwegian electronics companies and was given new equity to 
do so by its owner, the state. Particularly noteworthy among these takeovers was Kongsberg’s 
acquition of Norcontrol – a ship automation company founded in 1965.
35 
   19
Elektrisk Bureau, the large maker of telecom equipment, also experienced rapidly changing 
technology and was able to shed parts of the workforce as production became more automated.
36 
The 1976 cornerstone plan had great promise for Elektrisk Bureau, not least in relation to the 
large programs for modernizing the national and Nordic telecom infrastructure that were 
underway. Telecommunications was perhaps the most constructive part of the cornerstone-plan, 
and around a quarter of Elektrisk Bureau’s shares were bought by Norwegian investors from L. 
M. Ericsson, which reduced the Swedish company’s share by a half. This was the result of 
negotiations between the Norwegian Government and the Wallenberg family, large owners of 
L.M. Ericsson. Elektrisk Bureau also took over Nera, a company experiencing a multitude of 
problems in the 1970s. For Elektrisk Bureau and STK, the situation in the 1970s was 
characterized by a close relationship with the authorities, not least the Ministry of transport. This 
gave the companies a certain planning horizon when production was being reorganized. The 
cornerstone-plan seemingly enhanced this situation, linking the traditional relations between the 
telecom sector and the Ministry of Transport more closely with national industrial policy and the 
Ministry of Industry. 
 
Simrad, like Tandberg, was challenged by Japanese competition.
37 Simrad, a producer of small 
hydro-acoustic equipment to fit all kinds of vessels everywhere, was a global innovator in a 
small niche. Traditionally its main competitors had been the likes of British Kelvin Hughes and 
German Atlas – with their naval roots – but the 1960s meant the arrival in international markets 
of a host of Japanese competitors like Furuno. Simrad met this competition in much the same 
way as Tandberg, through developing more advanced products and finding new products.   20
Slugging its way throughout the 1970s, Simrad experienced a situation that by 1980 resembled 
what Tandberg experienced in 1976 – falling sales and falling prices. 
 
Unlike Tandberg, Simrad responded with rationalization, reorganization, outsourcing of 
production, and splitting the company into several smaller units. The unit providing deep-water 
hydro-acoustic position equipment for the growing oil business became a huge success and was 
listed on the Oslo Stock-exchange in 1982. The unit making fishing equipment went into a deep 
crisis that was only solved when young engineers with some years experience from the NDRE 
was recruited and they radically redesigned Simrad’s sonar-equipment to take full advantage of 
the digital technology that they – unlike Simrad’s older engineers – had mastered. Building on 
that new technical platform, and the earnings from the oil-directed company that purchased the 
fishing business when it mastered the new technology, Simrad was a very successful company 
throughout the 1980s. The new national oil market became increasingly more important. 
 
There were several differences between Simrad and Tandberg, not least in terms of political 
climate. Simrad’s troubles emerged after Tandberg’s problems had sent shockwaves through the 
Norwegian political system. Tandberg’s bankruptcy in late 1978 – the same year that the state 
formally became sole owner – reflected the radical policy-shift taking place in Norwegian 
industrial policy, with the Tandberg-case being the most blatant example of policy 
mismanagement that for a time led to a very difficult Parliamentary situation for Labour in 
Government. 1978 was also the last year of general counter-cyclical economic measures, partly 
for some of the same reasons and the loss of competitiveness for Norwegian industry during the   21
late 1970s. It was out of the question in 1980 to help Simrad, even if Simrad’s politically 
conservative owner would have accepted it. 
 
To what extent had the “system” of productive interaction changed for the Norwegian IT 
industry during the 1970s? In one respect, the coming of activist policies of the 1960s had 
progressed into a very interventionist stance in the mid-1970s that was gone by 1978. The 
growing interdependencies between research institutions and the Governmental infrastructure of 
industrial finance was still in place, but the two companies formed in the 1960s to play important 
roles for the whole electronics industry – AME (integrated circuits) and Norsk Data 
(minicomputers) – functioned more or less as independent companies and did not play important 
roles in significant national networks. The most internationalized companies, Tandberg and 
Simrad, were hit hard by the new global competition and Tandberg ceased to exist, as did its 
mass market products. Simrad changed a great deal, from a family owned mass market operator 
to a stock-listed company selling complex technology for much higher prices. 
 
Two new changes were underway at the end of the 1970s, however, that were profound new 
developments to the whole after-war period. The first was Governmental promotion of the stock 
exchange as an alternative to industrial policy and state controlled funding, something which 
underlined the change of atmosphere and, of course, reflected liberal attitudes found in several 
western countries at the time, not least Great Britain and USA. The second change followed in 
the same ideological path, namely a gradual shift to a new purchasing policy on the part of the 
state. The Norwegian public sector was never a totally nationalistic purchaser of goods, 
reflecting strong liberal values.
38 But the 1980s certainly changed the tide to a liberal inclination.   22
Revolutionary change, part II 
While the 1970s had ended on a negative wave for the electronics industry, the first half of the 
1980s started with a bang. This proved to be the decade of the entrepreneurial IT firm, often 
listed on the stock exchange, and Simrad and Norsk Data were preeminent actors on this new 
stage. But the decade was ruinous to the larger Norwegian corporations, and when the 1990s 
came, Elektrisk Bureau, Norsk Data and Konsgsberg Våpenfabrikk – along with several new 
start-ups – were gone, and STK was a shadow of its former self, doomed to fail later in the 
decade. 
 
In retrospect the failures of the 1980s were a result of the deregulation wave, in addition to the 
continued technological revolution. The first casualty was Elektrisk Bureau. After fifty years as 
co provider for the Norwegian telecom monopoly, as one part of a politically influenced duopoly 
with STK being the other company, the “contract of the century”, the first fully digital switch for 
the Norwegian telecom infrastructure, was to be provided by one company through an 
international tender.
39 Elektrisk Bureau – partly nationalized in 1976-77 through the 
Government’s cornerstone-plan – was everybody’s favourite to win with L.M. Ericsson’s AXE-
system. But the contract went to STK, which promoted ITT’s still-incomplete “System 12”. 
Elektrisk Bureau was weak and ended up being merged into a Norwegian maker of electrical 
equipment, something that Elektrisk Bureau also made. When the great merger between Swedish 
ASEA and Swiss Brown Boveri happened in 1987, Elektrisk Bureau – through L.M.Ericsson’s 
25 % ownership, and the Wallenberg-family’s strong position in both ASEA and Ericsson – 
became part of ABB Norway. The telecom business that once had dominated Elektrisk Bureau 
became a minor part of ABB Norway.   23
STK did not fare much better.
40 Winning the 1983 contract turned out to be something of a 
Pyrrhic victory. Getting “System 12” operational was a huge undertaking and a strain on the 
relations between STK and majority-owner ITT. Even though “System 12” was a product of ITT, 
STK had to bear a lot of the cost. When in 1986 “System 12” actually functioned – a fully 
digitalized, modern switch – the benefactor was ITT, or more precisely ITT’s owners who were 
able to get a good price for the firm’s telecom operations in a sale to French Alcatel. STK was 
renamed Alcatel Norway and this turned out to be the beginning of the end for what had until 
then been a semi independent company with a sure Norwegian market. STK/Alcatel was not 
helped when the next big contract for Norwegian switches in 1990 went to Ericsson Norway, the 
telecom-remainder of Elektrisk Bureau that subsequently had been sold to Ericsson. From then 
on Alcatel Norway was reduced to little more than a sales organization for the large French 
multinational.  
 
On one level the rapid creation of two new multinationals in the same year – 1987 – affecting the 
duopoly of Norwegian telecom producer might be seen as coincidental. And if such a sign of 
increased globalisation was not coincidental, the role of Norway hardly mattered. According to 
Sverre Christensen’s recent doctoral thesis about STK it certainly did, as Norway was one of the 
countries most open to international competition and modernization of its telecom network.
41 
Getting the Norwegian contract – the first fully digital switch – was getting ahead of the 
competition and may to some extent have affected international telecom strategies. But the 
changed attitude of the Norwegian Government to purchasing telecom equipment certainly must 
have changed private investors’ attitudes towards participating in this industry. Although both 
STK/Alcatel and Elektrisk Bureau/Ericsson Norway were foreign-owned, they had had a   24
significant Norwegian component within them. Several new companies have been created in the 
aftermath of the dismantling of Elektrisk Bureau and STK, the most significant of which was 
Nera, listed on the stock exchange in 1994 after seventeen years in the Elektrisk Bureau/ABB 
fold. More than anything, however, the attitude of the Norwegian Government shed light on why 
there was no Norwegian contender in the commercialization of the next great innovation in 
telecommunications, GSM. 
 
Mobile telephony – with its use of radiowaves – was “natural” for Norway, that is to say the 
Norwegian nature and topography with high mountains and lots of sea had made its mark on 
Norwegian telecommunications competence.
42 In addition to maritime radios, satellite-
communication and radio links, the Norwegian Defence had been particularly concerned with 
radio communication.
43 Televerket’s R&D Institute was also very active. Both Elektrisk Bureau 
and STK had been active in these fields based on their respective Norwegian competence, 
Elektrisk Bureau being in particular an expert on radio communication while STK made military 
switches.
44 Up until the early 1990s Norway also had a maker of mobile telephones, Simonsen 
Elektro, the company that Simrad-founder Willy Simonsen started when he left his original 
company in 1967. Simonsen Elektro was the Norwegian counterpart to Ericsson and Nokia in the 
system developed by the Nordic telecom providers called NMT. In the latter part of the 1980s, 
when the international community had chosen the wireless technology originally developed by a 
Norwegian scientist as its GSM-system, Simonsen Elektro, Elektrisk Bureau/ABB and a 
Norwegian research organisation tried to develop a coordinated system of products to compete 
internationally. Problems at Simonsen Elektro, and the effects of the ABB-merger, led to the 
termination of the project, however, and Norway did not become a GSM-contender.   25
The situation around 1990 for Norwegian mobile telephony may be compared to the situation 
following Tandberg’s bankruptcy.
45 Mass market opportunities for mobile telephony and colour 
televisions were not exploited by Norwegians. The two situations were very different, but in 
some respects they may both have reflected a lack of managerial strength. Tandberg’s 
managerial strength was pulverized through the drawn out process of fighting against the market, 
and the new owners of Tandberg after the bankruptcy saw the television challenge as too big – 
which it probably was for people without industry experience.
46 In mobile telephony there was 
no company that could take the lead. There was an abundance of technical competence in 
companies and research institutions to support a Norwegian entry into mobile telephony around 
1990.  But entry demanded entrepreneurship and financial commitment of a kind that was harder 
to find. 
 
Simonsen Elektro was a natural candidate because of its market positions (Simonsen made 
highly regarded quality-phones), but the increased international competition in the NMT-
business added to the particular Norwegian economic downturn at the end of the 1980s made an 
effort difficult. CEO and part owner Simonsen, who had the experience and competence needed 
for such an effort, was almost into his eighties and ended up selling the company. The 
comparison between Norway and Finland at the inception of GSM technology is instructive. 
Both countries possessed similar competences in relevant fields, but Nokia was financially more 
powerful, had a broader competence base than Simonsen, and was much better commercially 
positioned within NMT than Simonsen.
47 The other company that could have played such a role 
in Norway, Elektrisk Bureau/ABB Norway, continued its effort for some time, but chose in 1990 
to sell its Telecom business to Ericsson, creating Ericsson Norway. Perhaps there was some   26
Swedish coordination on the part of ABB/Ericsson getting rid of a possible Norwegian 
contender, but in 1990 Ericsson had yet to formulate a strong strategy for GSM growth.
48 
 
Following the fall in oil prices, the early 1990s was a period of economic problems in Norway.  
It was a period of consolidation, and no company consolidated more than ABB Norway, the 
successor to Elektrisk Bureau: It reorganized its electricity business, sold its telecom business 
and went full-throttle into petroleum-related activities.
49 Much activity in Norway has since the 
1970s gone in the petroleum-direction, crowding out other kinds of investments. ABB Norway 
proved to be a huge success in the 1990s, proving that getting rid of telecom and concentrating 
on oil-related activities was hardly the wrong decision. STK/Alcatel did try to pick up the pieces, 
i.e. continue state-supported research programs, after Simonsen etc. gave up, but the effort did 
not get French backing.
50 To cut a long story short, in Norway at the time investors feared the 
kind of effort that going for mass markets would entail. Why go into risky business in what was 
a high-cost nation when there were plenty of investment opportunities in the sector that made 
Norway such a high-cost location, namely oil, the attractive place to be even if price and 
activities had fallen since 1986? Why, indeed, go for telecom where no national purchases could 
be taken for granted? 
 
The fall in oil-prices hit the remaining big IT companies of Norway hard.
51 According to figure 1 
the only real downturn in terms of reduction of employment after 1972 is found after 1988. 
While the 50 percent fall in employment from 1987 to 1992 also reflects the international 
downturn in the beginning of the 1990s, most of this negative trend must be seen as closely 
related to the problems in the Norwegian economy. Elektrisk Bureau and STK changed fairly   27
gradually and according to changes in the public procurement policies, but some companies met 
their problems in a more abrupt and damaging way. 
 
The first of the companies to face liquidation in 1987 was Kongsberg Våpenfabrikk, the state 
owned weapons-manufacturer that had been operative since 1814. The official investigation 
following its liquidation revealed a company that for many years had not fulfilled its budgets and 
had filled its financial needs directly from the Government, justified by a continuous process of 
investing in new and exciting technological areas.
52 What happened – stated more crudely – was 
that the new political climate exemplified by the Tandberg bankruptcy finally caught up with 
Kongsberg Våpenfabrikk when the oil price fell in late 1986 and the economic boom of the 
1980s wound down. Government spending was dramatically cut both to stabilize the economy 
and to reflect the lower level of petrol taxes. Kongsberg, who remarkably had been refinanced 
several times during the 1980s, was turned down – for the first time – when it asked for more 
money in 1987. Several new companies were created after the demise of Kongsberg 
Våpenfabrikk; the largest were Kongsberg Gruppen (defence electronics, state owned), 
Kongsberg Offshore Systems/FMC Kongsberg (for underwater oil-production systems), 
Kongsberg Automotive (for car parts) and a few others. A great hit of the 1980s until the oil 
price fell – Kongsberg Albatross, the world leader in dynamic positioning equipment – was sold 
for a song to collaborator Simrad. Albatross had been viewed as a great success in the 
modernization of Kongsberg Våpenfabrikk by extensive use of IT. 
 
The next big casualty was Norsk Data, for a long time the most successful Norwegian IT 
company of the 1980s.
53 While Norsk Data’s initial success depended on being an innovator in   28
the mini computer market, its strategy throughout the 1980s left it very vulnerable when the cuts 
in Norwegian Government spending hit the Norwegian public sector, an important market for 
Norsk Data. Originally started as a seller of mini machines, to a wide variety of users, in many 
countries, Norsk Data tried to become a systems provider selling programs and packages most 
notably for various organizational tasks, often made in collaborations with Norwegian 
government agencies and partly financed through R&D contracts. The coming of the PC 
(personal computer), open systems and its dependence on the Norwegian market, all contributed 
to Norsk Data’s fall. When public Norway stopped purchasing from Norsk Data, the company 
failed. Norsk Data was not alone in failing, of course, and to some degree the downfall of Norsk 
Data and Tandberg reflected new developments in highly competitive international markets. In 
contrast to Tandberg, Norsk Data did not really have a sophisticated strategy for surviving such 
international and technological competition. Norsk Data and its emphasis in developing closed-
system applications for its computers resembled market leader Digital Equipment Corporation, 
also a company that failed.
54 Indeed, Norsk Data was hardly alone in failing as a mini computer 
company. But like Kongsberg Våpenfabrikk, Norsk Data failed to meet market expectations and 
failed to recognize how the new political realities of Norwegian technology policy, which had 
weakened the positions of “national champions,” had increased its vulnerability to market 
competition. 
 
The 1980s changed the Norwegian system of innovation for IT. Superficially, there were still 
numerous contacts between Government loan institutions and the Norwegian research council 
and the Norwegian IT sector, and some positive outcomes resulted. But the Government 
procured differently by the end of the 1980s. Nationally motivated purchases had been   29
abandoned in important markets, delimiting the influence of research policy and favourable loans 
to their more or less direct results. Even more dramatically, all the large actors of the sector – 
having meticulously been built up from the inter-war period – were gone. Tandberg and Norsk 
Data went bankrupt. Elektrisk Bureau and STK was dramatically reorganized, not least because 
there was little to be gained by having a R & D operation for telecommunications in Norway 
given the new policies. Televerket’s R&D Institute changed gradually to play a role only for 
Televerket, not the outside industry. Kongsberg Våpenfabrikk did not technically go bankrupt, 
but was discontinued as a legal entity. Overall, the microelectronic revolution and the global 
competition gaining force in the 1970s had contributed to a revolutionary change for the 
Norwegian IT industry. There had been a regulatory change away from the political steering of 
this sector towards a much more market oriented situation for business. And the change was not 
without success. 
 
Slow growth, small companies (1991-2006)  
For the Norwegian economy, the years between 1987 and 1993 were very problematic. The fall 
in the oil prices hit the general level of activity of the Norwegian economy, which, when the 
international downturn following the Gulf war took effect, transformed itself into a full-blown 
property and banking crisis. On another level the political milieu in Norway finally realized that 
most of the high income from oil and gas had to be kept outside the Norwegian economy, so the 
period from around 1990 until today has been characterized by fairly steady development and a 
decent economic climate, not altogether bad for an internationally competitive industry. 
   30
To some degree “oil as a problem” was displaced by “oil as a solution”, as some of the more 
successful Norwegian IT companies found a profitable market in the Norwegian oil industry. 
Simrad was a forerunner here, and in addition to its products for dynamic position systems for 
seabed mapping by hydro-acoustics were made.
55 Many of the new IT products followed in the 
wake of the so called “Deals for technology”, a Government-induced system after 1978 that gave 
oil companies goodwill in the process of handling out new concession for oilfields if they 
purchased Norwegian technology.
56 Some of the deals made between Norwegian companies and 
oil companies were not about oil related activities at all, and Norsk Data was a huge benefactor. 
But some new products were developed in response to this new source of demand, and the full 
effect of this influx of fresh research money is hard to grasp in all its complexity. 
 
This new policy reflected the character of the changes in economic policy of the late 1970s. 
Gone were the days when the Government directly supported companies like Tandberg. That 
was dangerous for the Government when Tandberg failed. Gone were the days (they were never 
many) when large contracts given by the Government directly supported companies. That could 
also be dangerous for the Government. But “rigged” markets, the political construction of new 
networks between foreign oil companies and Norwegian technology-providers, giving the oil 
companies benefits later, was for some years after 1978 a viable alternative. Norway most 
certainly did not convert to anything like pure and principled liberalism in the late 1970s, and the 
limited nature of these shifts in policy may have contributed to the lack of understanding of the 
political changes on the part of Kongsberg Våpenfabrikk’s leadership. 
   31
The companies benefiting the most in various ways from the oil economy may have been the 
successors of Kongsberg Våpenfabrikk. First, the maker of underwater production systems (and 
a firm whose products and technologies spanned much more than IT), Kongsberg Offshore 
Systems/FMC experienced a commercial breakthrough when underwater production systems by 
and large came to replace large platforms.
57 Kongsberg Gruppen, the defence-products company 
and the real successor to Kongsberg Våpenfabrikk, adapted to the changing geopolitical climate 
after 1990 with a series of acquisitions of companies in maritime electronics, including 
Norcontrol, previously under the Kongsberg umbrella. The large and important purchase was 
Kongsberg’s unfriendly takeover of Simrad in 1996, and Simrad became the cornerstone in 
Kongsberg Maritime, which in addition to Kongsberg Defence and Aerospace was one of the 
two significant parts of Kongsberg Gruppen. Kongsberg Maritime had a range of offshore 
customers, but oil related activities were the significant market for this new entity.
58 
 
It is difficult to quantify the positive role of oil for the IT industry of the 1990s. For Kongsberg 
Maritime it played a significant role as a market for the company. For Kongsberg Offshore 
System and ABB’s oil business IT was an integral part of larger technical systems and therefore 
important for the development of new and complex products. For the telecommunications sector 
developing an infrastructure for the Norwegian petroleum sector has been an ongoing task 
covering several technological phases and different actors.
59 The single most compelling 
illustration of oil’s helpful role may just be that the largest IT company of Norway, Kongsberg 
Gruppen, is the one company where oil clearly has meant the most. This is also the one company 
most clearly building its future on the technical past of two of the most important companies of 
the postwar era, namely Kongsberg Våpenfabrikk and Simrad.   32
The rebuilding of a strong Kongsberg group created the only major new IT industrial enterprise 
in Norway during the 1990s. Otherwise the 1990s and the ensuing years of the new decade have 
been characterized by organic growth of old and new enterprises. Most of the largest enterprises 
of this period were remnants of the former large enterprises. The revival of the Tandberg-
companies was the most remarkable phenomenon. Apart from the computer company, Tandberg 
Data, that has recently been split in two, the company that was the continuation of Tandberg 
Radiofabrikk became in the early 1980s rather dormant. Its revival, which eventually led to the 
creation of two companies, was based on new technology from Televerket’s R&D Institute. Both 
technologies were concerned with moving pictures, and one of the companies make equipment 
for telephony with live pictures, while the other one makes equipment for satellite transmission 
of live pictures (television). There are several off-spins from Elektrisk Bureau, STK and Norsk 
Data, and while never a commercial success the maker of integrated circuits, AME, has spawned 
a number of different companies. 
 
The biggest success of all, albeit one that was not an industrial firm, was the international 
success of Telenor, the part-privatized old Televerket that was able to grow significantly abroad, 
not least through becoming mobile operator in several countries. Telenor has been a clever 
strategist, but all three observers of Telenor and the Norwegian telecom industry have thought 
that what was the Norwegian telecom industry’s loss was Telenor’s gain.
60 While STK and 
Elektrisk Bureau went down, Telenor went up. Telenor’s success relied on a number of factors 
such as the input from Televerket’s R & D Institute, its own work to modernize the Norwegian 
infrastructure, which reached a high point with the specifications for the digital switch contract   33
in 1983, and a continued input of highly qualified and very experienced people who somehow 
were made redundant with the demise of Elektrisk Bureau and STK.  
 
Industrial reorganisation also had other ramifications. In the wake of the dramatic reorganization 
of Simrad in the early 1980s, following a strategy that Tandbergs Radiofabrikk rejected, 
considerable production activity has been outsourced. Other IT companies have followed Simrad 
in outsourcing production. Out of this development several new companies have been formed, 
and Kitron, a specialist in the making of IT goods, has become a – in a Norwegian perspective – 
fairly large company specialising in contract-production. The making of specialized production 
companies underlined the transformation of traditional, manufacturing-oriented electronics firms 
into information manipulating companies with strong engineering footings. To a large degree 
this entailed a generational shift within the companies, and if the case of Simrad is 
representative, the R & D departments of these firms now are filled with “young people” skilled 
in digital technology.
61 A specialised company like Simrad had many positions for “old” 
engineers, however, not least in a sales-force that was active globally. 
 
What were the dynamics of the 1990s? To some extent, of course, the IT industry built on past 
achievements and new market-opportunities. But most of these companies had to reinvent their 
market positions and reconstruct their efforts in new ways. The situation – with Kongsberg being 
the exception – called more for reliance on new brains rather than accumulated corporate 
knowledge and culture. The continued development of a small scale Norwegian IT industry must 
to no little extent reflect the continuous input of newly educated engineers able to master new 
technological and commercial challenges.  Indeed, the influx of highly educated young people   34
willing and able to adapt to rapidly changing circumstances, more often than not in a national 
rather than an international context, has been a historic hallmark and strength of the Norwegian 
IT industry throughout the past century. 
 
The continued growth of the industry during the 1990s and 2000s tell a story of a quiet revival. 
The stock-market crisis of 2000 was remarkably good to the Norwegian IT industry, something 
that may be explained by a certain lack of a “bubble frenzy” in the Norwegian industry prior to 
the crisis. Indeed, one success factor in this period may be the realistic attitude within the 
industry, an attitude that parts of the industry had ample opportunity to develop during the 1970s 
and 1980s. There is nothing bold and flashy about the Norwegian IT industry of 2007, and the 
various hypes of history’s yesterdays – “information” or “knowledge” economy, “high tech 
industry”, “new economy” – seem left behind. That is partly because there is so little that is 
flashy left, and the Norwegian IT industry of today is finding its niches, a lot of them strongly 
related to needs – past and present – in the Norwegian economy. 
 
Conclusion 
Seen in a strictly comparative perspective, Norway is the Nordic IT industrial laggard, not too far 
behind Denmark. Seen against the huge ambitions industrial actors and politicians have had 
during 1970s and 1980s for international success, the Norwegian IT industry is a failure. 
Measured against all the company failures and the many situations of crises, the Norwegian IT 
industry has failed in ways that have left many people in economic misery. But the Norwegian 
industry has survived, it has developed and eventually resumed growth, and it was able through 
painful changes to adapt to technical change, global challenges and new opportunities. It has   35
throughout the twentieth century, and not least during Norway’s oil boom, been an important 
competence in the broader transformation of the Norwegian economy. While comparing Norway 
to other nations gives interesting perspectives, the most important lesson to be learned from the 
history – recent as well as old – of the Norwegian IT industry is its integration into the rest of the 
economy. The failure of the Norwegian IT industry to develop products for huge foreign markets 
may have benefited at least some other sectors of the Norwegian economy, who have had 
partners to make specialized products needed for particular purposes. 
 
This development has been characterized by both continuity and change. The most dramatic 
change has come in the fortunes of the companies. Some of the company failures have also 
meant the extinction of whole sectors of the Norwegian electronics industry, as consumer 
electronics, computers, mobile telephony, have vanished. But smaller organizations, making 
equipment for the maritime sector, building on old competences, have continued, and have 
contributed to larger economic activities within Norway– running boats, the process industry, the 
whole oil business. The influx of oil in the Norwegian economy has been particularly important 
in this recent history, contributing a complex mix of higher factor costs (1970s and 1980s in 
particular) and volatile markets (rapid changes in public sector spending in 1980s) on the one 
hand, while on the other representing new markets for specialized products as well as giving 
grants and helping with finance of R & D. The huge oil sector has also sucked managerial and 
engineering talent away from IT production, as well as representing a very attractive market for 
private capital looking for new opportunities. 
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Seen against this background, the Norwegian IT industry represents something of a success 
story, as the industry has contributed to Norwegian economic growth based on natural resources 
being utilized by advanced technology. More than that, the history of the Norwegian IT industry 
– building on its forerunner the electronics industry and preceding the IT service and software 
sector – may, perhaps, be seen as a case of how the whole Norwegian IT sector have been 
functioning, namely as an integral part of the Norwegian economy. General Norwegian 
economic growth – and Norway is one of the richest nations in the world per capita – has been 
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TABLE 1: Turnover and number of employees in the ICT sector (over total population) 
Turnover (EUR)  Number of employees   
Country \ Year  2000 2001 2002 2003 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Norway  5056.1 5536.7 5217.5 4354.7 0.0189 0.0214 0.0187 0.0158 
Finland  4791.7 5137.1 5041.5 5247.8 0.0211 0.0225 0.0207 0.0209 
Sweden  7112.3 6388.5 5823.3 5338.4 0.0234 0.0258 0.0224 0.0200 
Denmark  4987.3 5107.0 5060.0 4765.9 0.0195 0.0196 0.0181 0.0173 
Source: OECD & Nordic Information Society Statistics 2005, Copenhagen: Nordic Council of 
Ministers 
 
TABLE 2: ICT Goods 
ICT goods* 
Country \ Year 
1973 2000 2001 2002  2003 
Norway  2.2 3.4 3.6 3.9 3.1 
Finland 1.1  20.9  19.6  19.8  17.7 
Sweden  4.0 14.1  11.9 9.2  7.4 
Denmark  3.2 4.4 4.3 4.5 4.3 
*as percentage of total national industrial sales (sources:  
Elektronikkindustri, Oslo: Norges Offentlige utredninger, 1976: 30 and personal communication 
from Ole-Petter Kordahl, Statistics Norway as a supplement to: Nordic Information Society 
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FIGURE 1: Norwegian ICT-goods industries by Year from 1972 – 2005 
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Production from 1972-1992 (billion kroner, fixed prices, Norges Bank’s index. 2005 = 100)* Production from 1992-2005 (billion kroner, fixed prices, Norges Bank’s index. 2005 = 100)**
 * Source: Statistics, Norway. From Nils Petter Skirstad. Based on the ISIC-
classification (1973-1992). 
**Source: Statistics, Norway. From Nils Petter Skirstad. Based on the NACE-
classification (1992-2005). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 